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Theorising commercial society: Rousseau, Smith and Hont 
 
This is a post-print version of the article and is not for citation. The published version is 
available at https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885118782390. 
 
In his posthumously published lectures, Politics in Commercial Society, István Hont 
argues that Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith should be understood as 
theorists of commercial society. This article challenges Hont’s interpretation of 
both thinkers and shows that some of his key claims depend on conflating the 
terms ‘commercial society’ and ‘commercial sociability’. I argue that, for Smith, 
commercial society should not be defined in terms of the moral psychology of 
commercial sociability, before questioning Hont’s Epicurean interpretation of 
Smith’s theory of sociability. I then turn to Rousseau and outline some of the 
difficulties involved with classifying him as a theorist of commercial society, the 
most important of which is that he often appeared to be more deeply opposed to 
commercial progress than Hont suggests. I conclude by highlighting some of the 
most salient differences between Rousseau’s and Smith’s views of the politics of 
eighteenth-century Europe.  
 
István Hont (2005: 156) thought that intellectual history, at its best, could lead us to ask more 
penetrating questions about the present. Understanding the questions past thinkers asked, and 
the answers they pursued, might ‘help us avoid repeating the same questions again and again, 
running in circles unproductively.’ If, for example, we think there is a contemporary crisis of the 
nation-state, we would do well to reflect on its intellectual origins and consider how this label 
came to be applied to the states we inhabit today. Viewed this way, those who posit a 
contemporary crisis fail to see that the tensions and problems they identify have been inherent in 
the idea of the nation-state from its inception. The nation-state, on Hont’s (2005: especially 447-
456) analysis, has always been in crisis. More generally, turning to the early-modern period may 
allow us to understand our own predicament better, for the ‘commercial future that many 
eighteenth-century observers imagined as plausible has become our historical present.’ (Hont, 
2005: 156) 
In Politics in Commercial Society: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith, the posthumously 
published version of his 2009 Carlyle Lectures, Hont adopts a similar approach. Too often 
commercial society is ‘used incorrectly and in a theoretically imprecise sense … as a theoretical 
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category, commercial society is hardly used correctly at all.’ (4)1 Scholars often use the term to 
distance their analysis from the Marxist language of capitalism or bourgeois society, but this 
‘remains an unfinished journey’. One aim of the book is thus ‘to throw some light on its possible 
use in political thought.’ (6) Hont’s guides in doing so are Rousseau and Smith and, in a work 
that aims to surprise, one of its most ‘seemingly radical’ or ‘paradoxical’ arguments is that 
Rousseau, and not just Smith, should be read as a theorist of commercial society (2). Rousseau, 
of course, is often read as a critic of commercial society, but Hont uses the term ‘theorist’ in a 
narrower sense to argue that Rousseau’s own political and economic proposals were intended for 
commercial societies.  
 If the approach Hont takes is familiar from his earlier work, the experience of reading 
Politics in Commercial Society is somewhat different (a point nicely captured by Harris, 2016: 151-
152). It is a bold and insightful work, but those insights are not always fully developed and 
worked out in the text itself. We encounter nothing like the extensive footnotes that support 
many of Hont’s arguments elsewhere and are left wondering how these arguments would have 
looked had they been subjected to level of scholarly dissection characteristic of his other work. 
Hont aims to illuminate some of the most interesting points of comparison between Rousseau 
and Smith with a view to reorienting the way we understand both thinkers and the relation 
between them. The book comprises six chapters paired around the themes of ‘Commercial 
Sociability’, ‘Histories of Government’ and ‘Political Economy’. While these chapters focus on 
Rousseau and Smith, Hont’s coverage is wide-ranging and the book’s most original contribution 
is arguably its re-contextualisation of the Discourse on Inequality, which presents John Locke and 
Montesquieu as two of Rousseau’s principal interlocutors. 
In light of these considerations, I think the most rewarding and charitable way of reading 
Politics in Commercial Society is not as ‘a coherent and highly structured study that needs no further 
elaboration’ (xxi), as its editors suggest, but rather, and much as we might expect from a series of 
lectures, as a source of original and challenging theses that will repay further investigation. My 
aim here is to investigate some of those theses by assessing the status Hont accords both 
Rousseau and Smith as theorists of commercial society. In the case of Smith, I seek to 
disentangle Hont’s use of the terms ‘commercial society’ and ‘commercial sociability’, arguing 
that the former should not be defined in terms of the latter, before pushing back against his 
Epicurean reading of Smith on sociability. In the case of Rousseau, I highlight some of the 
difficulties involved with classifying him as a theorist of commercial society and argue that, in 
important respects, he and Smith did not share ‘a view of the type of society whose politics they 




Commercial society and commercial sociability  
 
The term commercial society is most readily associated with Adam Smith, even though the 
precise phrase is found only twice in The Wealth of Nations (1981: I.iv.1, V.i.f.52) and not at all in 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments.2 Hont identifies two characteristics of commercial society in Smith, 
which stretch its meaning beyond the idea of a society characterised by commercial activity. The 
first is quantitative. Commercial societies contain ‘a great deal of commercial and market activity.’ 
(3, my emphasis; see also Hont, 2005: 160-161) It is the extent of commercial activity that 
separates a commercial society from an agricultural society, its immediate historical predecessor. 
Only once the division of labour is ‘thoroughly established’, such that most people live by 
exchanging the surplus of their own labour for the produce of the labour of others, is the society 
properly termed commercial (Smith, 1981: I.iv.1) There is no clear line dividing agricultural from 
commercial societies, but the transition from one to the other is nonetheless accompanied by a 
qualitative change in social relations. The qualitative aspect of commercial society is that 
individuals relate ‘to one another as interactive commercial individuals, behaving generally as 
merchants act when entering a market.’ (3) As Smith (1981: I.iv.1) wrote in The Wealth of Nations, 
everyone ‘becomes in some measure a merchant’, a claim which echoes an important passage 
from The Theory of Moral Sentiments that is central to Hont’s analysis: 
Society may subsist among different men, as among different merchants, from a 
sense of its utility, without any mutual love or affection; and though no man in it 
should owe any obligation, or be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be 
upheld by a mercenary exchange of good offices according to an agreed valuation. 
(Smith, 1982b: II.ii.3.2) 
 
For Hont, it is this second, qualitative, aspect that is most important. ‘The concept of 
commercial society describes the constitutive moral quality of the membership of this society, 
not the actual material trading activity itself.’ For a society to be classified as commercial, then, it 
must be based on utility, rather than (for example) beneficence or solidarity, irrespective of the 
amount of trade that takes place (3-4). Smith, he later adds, worked out ‘a definition of 
commercial society in terms of moral psychology.’ (39) This point bears emphasising. Hont 
theorises commercial society in terms of the social bonds that characterise it. The defining 
feature of commercial society thus appears to be ‘commercial sociability’, by which he means ‘the 
utilitarian bonds created by commercial reciprocity.’ (7) 
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 Commercial sociability is not Smith’s term,3 but Hont uses it to capture the idea of a 
society of merchants. However, it is doubtful whether this should be taken as the defining 
feature of commercial society for Smith. In the key passage from The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he 
does not distinguish between different stages in the historical development of society, which is 
precisely what gives the idea of commercial society its explanatory power. To be sure, he was 
certainly concerned with the relation between commercial development and moral psychology. 
He associated commerce with probity, punctuality and prudence, while also arguing that its 
development tends to extinguish courage and martial spirit, and leave the lowest ranks of society 
uneducated (Smith, 1982a: 538-541). Yet his explanations of how commercial society differs 
from agricultural society make no reference to moral psychology and instead focus on the 
extension of commercial exchange, ‘not only betwixt the individualls of the same society but 
betwixt those of different nations.’ (Smith 1982a: 15-16) According to the ‘natural course of 
things’, a growing society directs its capital first ‘to agriculture, afterwards to manufactures, and 
last of all to foreign commerce’, even if modern European states have inverted this process 
(Smith, 1981: III.i.8-9). It is the advancement in manufacturing and foreign commerce, in 
particular, which he seemed to regard as the defining characteristics of a commercial rather than 
an agricultural society (see also Smith, 1981: V.i.a.6, V.iii.1). Hont, of course, is well aware of this 
side of Smith’s analysis, but, by focusing predominantly on commercial sociability, he presents 
commercial society in a very different light to the one thinker whose use of the term ‘validates it 
historically’ (3).  
 One reason for keeping the terms commercial society and commercial sociability distinct 
is that they answer different questions. In the opening chapter of the book, the term commercial 
sociability is first discussed in relation to Thomas Hobbes. If humans are not naturally sociable 
creatures, desirous of society for its own sake, then what drives them to enter society? In De Cive 
Hobbes (1998: i.2) answered that societies exist for ‘the sake of advantage or of glory’. But this 
claim is about human society in general. For Smith, the question of what drives humans to enter 
society is not a question about commercial society, since commercial society is the last of the 
four historical stages that human society takes. If commercial sociability is an explanation of 
what drives humans to live together in society in the first place, then it must apply to the earliest 
forms of human society, which were not commercial. If commercial sociability denotes the social 
bonds that characterise commercial societies, then it no longer answers the question of what 
originally drives humans to live together. The editors highlight the paradoxical nature of bringing 
the terms ‘commercial’ and ‘sociability’ together (xiii-xiv). But it is unclear that this paradox is 
illuminating. The phrase ‘commercial sociability’ conflates two different questions – one about 
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the origins of human sociability, the other about the social bonds that characterise commercial 
society – which are best kept distinct. This is evident, for example, when Hont considers the 
possibility that Smith was ‘analyzing a commercial society as the source of morality’ (18). This is 
perfectly plausible if Hont’s point is about commercial sociability, but if it is about commercial 
society then it implies that Smith thought there was no morality in the hunting, pastoral or 
agricultural societies that preceded commercial society, which is clearly not the case. 
 While Hont appears to be offering a genealogy of commercial society in the opening 
chapter of the book, then, his focus quickly (and silently) shifts to commercial sociability.4 The 
comparisons he draws between Rousseau and Smith, at least in the first two chapters, concern 
questions of sociability. In early-modern Europe these questions were often couched in terms of 
Stoicism vs. Epicureanism, and Hont adopts these labels to analyse the moral theories underlying 
Rousseau’s and Smith’s politics. Broadly speaking, Stoics held that humans were originally moral 
and sociable creatures, whereas for Epicureans morality and sociability were not original to 
human nature and developed only as a consequence of pursuing happiness (15-16). In arguing 
that they were theorists of commercial sociability, Hont places both Rousseau and Smith on the 
Epicurean side of the debate. He thereby arrives at one of the book’s central arguments: 
Rousseau and Smith shared a moral theory – one that was at base Epicurean – even if their 
political visions differed (22). 
In the Preface to his Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau (1992a: 14-15) famously denied 
natural sociability and posited two principles of human nature that precede the use of reason: 
love of self (amour de soi-même) and pity (pitié). Hont maintains that Smith’s account of sympathy 
in the opening passages of The Theory of Moral Sentiments is based on generalising the pity model 
from Rousseau’s Discourse.5 Some of the earliest critics of the Discourse associated it with Hobbism 
and Epicureanism, and, for Hont, if Rousseau was an Epicurean then so too was Smith. Indeed, 
he goes so far as to claim that Smith presented ‘himself as someone who had properly developed 
the Hobbesian stream—that is, the selfish system…—to its proper conclusion’. The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments ‘was a treatise in enhanced Hobbism and Epicureanism.’ (32) The textual 
evidence supporting this is Smith’s remark that self-love theories seem ‘to have arisen from some 
confused misapprehension of the system of sympathy’, but Hont omits the opening sentence of 
the paragraph in question which gives a strikingly different impression: ‘Sympathy, however, 
cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a selfish principle.’ (Smith, 1982b: VII.iii.1.4). 
 As with Rousseau, Smith’s contemporary critics regarded him as an Epicurean (29-32). 
Yet Hont is well aware that reception history should be treated with caution, rightly noting that 
‘the prevalence of this view does not mean that it was fully or even substantially correct.’ (31) As 
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he later adds, ‘it is an extraordinary assumption to believe that only later generations 
misunderstood, whereas contemporaries do not’ (41). Caution is especially in order when the 
interpretation in question provided an easy way of discrediting an opponent’s theory, without 
having to undertake the far more difficult task of taking it seriously and showing precisely where 
it goes astray. When critics accused either Rousseau or Smith of Epicureanism, we should not 
assume that their primary aim was to accurately represent their interlocutor’s theory, rather than, 
say, diverting attention from the intricacies of that theory by charging them with guilt by 
association. This point, however, cuts both ways. When Smith (1982b: VII.ii.2.13) insisted that 
Epicureanism is ‘altogether inconsistent with that which I have been endeavouring to establish’, 
a defender of the Epicurean reading might respond that he was just attempting to distance 
himself from criticism, rather than accurately presenting his own position. But Smith’s denial of 
Epicureanism is well grounded, at least in respect to the principle of sympathy, which cannot 
straightforwardly be reduced to self-love.6 Admitting this does not make Smith a Stoic. Instead, it 
suggests that he may be best read as carving through the Stoic-Epicurean dichotomy to articulate 
a nuanced and original theory reducible to neither side of the debate as previously construed.7  
 
Was Rousseau a theorist of commercial society? 
 
Smith was clearly a theorist of commercial society. The claim that Rousseau deemed his own 
principles of political right applicable for commercial society is more controversial, although not 
without some adherents (most recently Tuck, 2016: 3-4, 141-142). Whether or not the claim is 
endorsed will partly depend on how commercial society is theorised, and in light of the 
preceding discussion that question merits some attention. Even if we accept that Rousseau is a 
theorist of commercial sociability, as Hont understands the term, it does not necessarily follow 
that he is a theorist of commercial society (cf. 25). Hont sometimes conflates these terms in his 
discussion of Rousseau, such as when he writes that the ‘second part of the second Discourse 
begins with a pure theory of commercial society in which there is no or little sociability but a 
great utilitarian need for cooperation.’ (45) Yet the second part of the Discourse opens by 
explaining the invention of property prior to the revolutions of agriculture and metallurgy, which 
means it can hardly be an instance of commercial society in Smith’s sense, that is, of the fourth 
and final stage of a long and complex process of economic development.  
 Like Smith, Rousseau thought that different stages of society could be identified based 
on different modes of human subsistence, and Hont offers an illuminating discussion of the 
posthumously published Essay on the Origin of Languages to fill in the gaps from the Discourse on 
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Inequality (57-61). Hont shows how, for Rousseau, associating to promote mutual utility was a 
feature of the northern societies that developed following enforced migration from their 
southern origins. As Rousseau (1998: 316) memorably remarked, the first words of southern 
peoples would have been aimez-moi, of northern peoples aidez-moi. In the Essay Rousseau 
distinguished between three ways of life: hunting, herding and agriculture. Hont adds that even if 
Rousseau did not mention a fourth stage, ‘he knew what it was: the rise of urbanization, the city, 
with its dense population and ever-increasing frequency of exchange processes.’ (61-62) The fact 
remains, however, that Rousseau only articulated a three-stage theory here and did not see the 
need to explicitly theorise a further distinction between agricultural and commercial societies, as 
we find in Smith. This point is worth keeping in mind whenever questions about whether 
Rousseau was a proponent or critic of commercial society arise. Any answer will depend on how 
commercial society is theorised, and that theory must be read back into Rousseau. 
 Leaving this difficulty aside, Hont’s analysis of Rousseau’s vision of an ‘exchange-based 
commercial society in which everything grew in a balanced way’ (104) is especially welcome. 
Political economy remains one of the most neglected dimensions of Rousseau’s thought, which 
can lead to considerable misrepresentations of his ideas. Hont suggests that there is little basis 
for thinking that Rousseau supported ‘a command economy, based on enforcement’, and instead 
declares, somewhat subversively, that he ‘was essentially a kind of libertarian’ (101), by which 
Hont seems simply to mean a society based on labour, private property and trade between a 
‘network of agriculturally rooted household economies.’ (106) Hont also challenges 
interpretations that take Rousseau to be opposed to all forms of economic progress or growth; 
he was, rather, a critic only ‘of the excesses of commercial society.’ (91) Rousseau, according to 
Hont, only opposed unbalanced growth, especially that which set the interests of agriculture and 
industry against one another. ‘There was nothing wrong or evil with economic development as 
such. What was wrong, damaging, and morally evil was unbalanced growth: the runaway growth 
of cities, luxury, and industry’ (104).     
Precisely how critical Rousseau comes across varies depending on which text is consulted, 
and one of the merits of Politics in Commercial Society is to focus attention on his writings for 
Corsica and Poland, along with his Encyclopédie article on political economy, which might lead us 
to read the more familiar Social Contract in a different light. Yet Rousseau often seems a lot more 
resistant to commercial progress than Hont allows, most strikingly in his proposals for Corsica, 
the one country in modern Europe he deemed still capable of receiving good laws (Rousseau, 
1994: ii.10). There Rousseau (2005a: 127) argues that commerce and agriculture are ‘incompatible’ 
and cannot flourish together, a theme that recurs in other writings (Rousseau, 1992b: 154; 2005b: 
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209-210). He was unequivocal on this point: ‘I look at every system of commerce as destructive 
of agriculture so much so that I make no exception even for commerce in commodities that are 
the product of agriculture.’ (Rousseau, 2005a: 139) In the passages where Rousseau comes 
closest to distinguishing between agricultural and commercial bases of society, then, he does so 
in defence of the former against the latter. A thoroughgoing defence of the thesis that Rousseau 
is a theorist of commercial society would need to address such passages. 
When writing with Geneva in mind, Rousseau recognised that there was no escaping the 
level of commercialisation and urbanisation that had already taken place. As he wrote in a 
passage often cited by those who read him as a theorist of commercial society (e.g. Tuck, 2016: 
2-3, 141-142), Genevans ‘are Merchants, Artisans, Bourgeois, always occupied with their private 
interests, with their work, with their trafficking, with their gain; people for whom even liberty is 
only a means for acquiring without obstacle and for possessing in safety.’ (Rousseau, 2001: 293). 
Here Rousseau did seem to be theorising a society characterised by the utilitarian bonds created 
by commercial reciprocity, which, to recall, is how Hont defines commercial sociability (the 
moral psychology definitive of commercial society). But it is worth highlighting that Rousseau 
was criticising Genevans in the passage in question and more generally bemoaned the escalation 
of commerce and manufacturing in Switzerland, which led to citizens becoming corrupt: ‘love of 
fatherland (l’amour de la patrie), extinguished in all hearts, gave way there to love of money alone’ 
(Rousseau, 2005a: 136). Perhaps commercial sociability was all that remained to bind Genevans 
together in the 1760s, but this was the case for neither Corsica nor Poland. In relation to the 
latter, Hont stresses the importance of appealing to citizens’ sense of genuine honour – not 
Montesquieu’s false honour – through civic and economic distinctions (120), but the purposes of 
these honours, for Rousseau (2005b: 176), was to inculcate ‘all the patriotic virtues’ by keeping 
citizens ‘ceaselessly occupied with the fatherland’ and thereby instilling in their hearts a more 
powerful desire than that of becoming wealthy.  
Smith (1982b: II.ii.3.2) thought that society could subsist ‘from a sense of its utility, 
without any mutual love or affection’. Such a society, ‘though less happy and agreeable, will not 
necessarily be dissolved.’ Rousseau was not so confident and at times argued that it was 
necessary – contra Smith (1982b: II.ii.3.1) – that citizens are ‘bound together by the agreeable 
bonds of love and affection’. As Rousseau (2005b: 152-154) wrote in the Discourse on Political 
Economy, the ‘fatherland cannot subsist without freedom, nor freedom without virtue, nor virtue 
without citizens.’ Political virtue is cashed out in terms of amour de la patrie, and, as Hont observes 
in a different context, it is important to emphasise that Rousseau was talking about love here (60). 
Hont argues that the Discourse on Inequality should be read as Rousseau’s response to 
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Montesquieu’s defence of modern monarchy as a stable system based on false honour and 
inequality (especially 43-45, 72-73). This is certainly plausible, but there is some tension between 
presenting Rousseau as both a theorist of commercial society and a fierce critic of Montesquieu. 
Indeed, Rousseau (1994: iii.4) reproached Montesquieu for failing to see that political virtue, 
which they both understood in terms of amour de la patrie, is the principle of all legitimate states. 
If we follow Hont’s approach of theorising commercial society in terms of its moral psychology, 
then, it is not evident that the type of society whose politics Rousseau wanted to change was one 




The reason why asking whether Rousseau’s political and economic proposals were intended for 
commercial society matters is because it offers a way of tying his thought to the present. If we 
live in commercial societies today, and Rousseau was a theorist of commercial society, then he 
may still have something to teach us, even if it is only in seeing where and why he fell short and 
pondering whether we have progressed much further since (132). When considering why 
Rousseau’s and Smith’s politics turned out differently, however, Hont observes that ‘Rousseau 
was Genevan, and The Social Contract addresses city republics like Geneva’, which involved 
cutting short ‘the long-term history of Europe … by making it appear as if the politics of ancient 
city-states, and particularly that of the Roman Republic, could be continued a millennium and a 
half later.’ Smith, by contrast, saw that ‘modern European politics was no longer the politics of 
city-states.’ (63-64) Whether or not this difference maps onto the question of theorising 
commercial society, it is arguably the most salient difference for thinking about Rousseau and 
Smith as theorists of modern politics. Hont’s observation neatly captures why Smith came much 
closer than Rousseau to having theorised the type of societies that would prevail in modern 
Europe. But it also reveals that Rousseau’s and Smith’s theories are not as close as Hont more 
generally argues, because, in this crucial respect, they did not share a view of the type of society 
whose politics they wanted to change. 
As with all Hont’s work, his lectures on Rousseau and Smith challenge us to think more 
deeply and carefully about the categories we use to understand modern politics. I have tried to 
show that theorising commercial society is even more complicated than Hont’s analysis suggests, 
by emphasising how his account departs from both Rousseau and Smith in key places. Towards 
the beginning of this article I quoted Hont’s comment that theorising commercial society is an 
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unfinished journey. Politics in Commercial Society offers frequent signposts, many of them pointing 




For helpful advice on earlier drafts of this paper I would like to thank Robert Jubb and Paul 
Sagar.  
 
                                                          
1  Unless otherwise indicated, all page numbers are to Hont (2015). Where relevant, references to early-modern 
sources are given by part/book/section/chapter/paragraph numbers as appropriate (rather than by page number) 
for ease of comparison with other editions. 
2  The clearest account of how the ‘Age of Commerce’ differs from those that preceded it – the ages of hunters, 
of shepherds and of agriculture – is found in Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence (1982a: 14-16, 459). 
3  In his important essay on Samuel Pufendorf’s influence on Smith’s four-stages theory, originally published in 
1986, Hont argued that Pufendorf ‘constructed his jurisprudence around the concept of commercial sociability’ 
(2005: 183), which occupied the conceptual space between Grotius’s account of natural sociability and 
Hobbes’s rejection of sociability. 
4  The relation between commerce and sociability has long been a central theme of Hont’s work (especially 1994: 
60-72; 2005, 37-51, 159-184), some of which he draws from in the opening chapter of Politics in Commercial 
Society. The relative brevity of his analysis in the opening chapter might explain why the conflation of 
‘commercial society’ and ‘commercial sociability’ appears starker there, along with the fact that he places more 
emphasis on defining commercial society in terms of its moral psychology than in his earlier work. 
5  For a different interpretation of the evidence underpinning this claim, see Douglass (2017, 605-606). More 
generally, see Griswold (2010: 61-71), who teases out some of the key philosophical differences between 
Smith’s sympathy and Rousseau’s pitié. On the question of Rousseau’s influence on Smith, see Sagar (2018), 
who pushes back against Hont’s interpretation while emphasising the more considerable influence of Hume.  
6  Also relevant here is Smith’s distinction between love of praise and love of praiseworthiness. While Smith 
never uses the term ‘sociability’ in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he does argue that where love of praise 
‘could only have made [man] wish to appear to be fit for society’, love of praiseworthiness ‘was necessary in 
order to render him really fit.’ (Smith, 1982b: III.2.7)  
7  See also Harris (2016: 162). It is tempting when contesting those who have read too much Stoicism into Smith 
(e.g. Force, 2003) to instead situate him in a modern Epicurean tradition (Robertson 2005: 395–396; see also 
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